We explore the relationship between science, technology and clinical process in the context of the new genetics through an examination of clinical work in the development of genetic science. In doing this we rethink the nature and location of knowledgebuilding in medical knowledge. Drawing on ethnographic research in clinical settings, we focus on the medical specialism of dysmorphology, which is the medical study of complex syndromes that impair physical development, often giving rise to abnormal appearances. Dysmorphology involves the professional recognition of distinctive physical features and the identification of a large number of named syndromes. Our findings indicate that dysmorphology represents a configuration of traditional clinical processes and new approaches to patient categorization using genetic profiling. But clinical work in dysmorphology is about much more than fitting patients into prefixed diagnostic categories. Rather, it emerges as crucial to the development of genetic classification, which is itself characterised by ambiguity, uncertainty and deferral.
Introduction
We examine the interaction of clinical perception and molecular technology to reconsider the nature and location of science in the development of genetic technologies.
Specifically, we focus on the processes of genetic categororization within the clinical specialty of dysmorphology. Categories are the basis of systems of classification and are infrastructural to organisation (Douglas 1966) ; categorical work consists of distinguishing, naming and sorting things into kinds or classes (Bowker and Star 2000) .
Categories arise from 'work and from other kinds of organised activity, including conflicts over meaning, that occur when multiple groups fight over the nature of a classificatory system and its categories' (Bowker and Star 2000: 285) . Genetic categorization is the specific work of distinguishing features and characteristics of persons (and other animals) as having (or not) a genetic origin. This work takes place within different domains, including the clinic and the laboratory and our analysis explores how genetic categorization is accomplished in the interaction of these two domains; although it is not necessary to describe the relationships in the agonistic terms employed by Bowker and Star. By genetic categorization, we do not refer simply to processes of recognition (fitting people into extant categories). Rather, we refer to patterns of identifying and naming physical features and other effects in people and in families as having a genetic base. What emerges from genetic categorical work is the very conception of the genetic, as an emergent and provisional domain of classification. It is important to begin to understand how genetic categorization is accomplished because it has moral and personal consequences: for example, new categories for identity (e.g. Brodwin 2002; Rabinow 1992 Rabinow , 2000 Strathern 1992 Strathern , 1996 ; 'genetic discrimination' (Ettore 2002: 18) ; or the assessment of risk to future generations (Chadwick 1992) . Our analysis focuses on the production of medical categories themselves (Yoxen 1982; Osbourne 1990 ), rather than on the impact of extra-medical social or cultural factors -a major strand in the sociology of medical work (e.g. Jeffery 1979 , White 2002 , Berg 1992 , Dingwall and Murray 1989 .
We draw on ethnographic research on the clinical specialism of dysmorphology to explore the work of genetic categorizing. Dysmorphology is the professional discipline of delineating disorders affecting the physical development of individuals, before or after birth (Aase 1990 ). Our observation of clinical process indicates that dysmorphology is an important case of the intersection of clinical perception, judgment and molecular technology (see also Shaw et al 2001) . We begin by considering the genealogy of the clinic in respect of the relationship between clinical work, science and technology. We then go on to describe the different elements of dysmorphology clinical process, including the different techniques, technologies, materials and practices involved. In our analysis, genetic clinical process is characterized by the privileging of clinical expertise over other kinds of technology.
Clinical expertise, as in earlier accounts of medical practice, involves a very special form of medical perception or 'gaze', as a particular ability to say that one 'sees' (Foucault 1976 ) in a disciplined way. The performance of clinical expertise is accompanied by the expression of uncertainty, ambiguity and deferral over the attribution of a clinical diagnosis (cf. Bharadwaj 2002 , Hedgecoe 2003 , Sarangi and Clarke 2002 .
Rather than identifying these characteristics of clinical process as a failure of science and technology, we address the significance of explicit ambivalence, uncertainty and deferral over genetic diagnosis.
We conclude that, in the current case of dysmorphology, clinical work does not just fit patients into extant diagnostic categories. Clinical work also involves identifying and naming which patterns of physical features and other effects have a genetic origin. Clinical work in dysmorphology constitutes 'categorical work' (Bowker and Star 2000) that is as much to do with the construction and refinement of categories as with their mere application. This finding is important because it prompts us to review how the dysmorphology clinic performs the relationship between science, technology and clinical work, which itself is of socio-cultural significance.
The Clinic
The genetics clinic offers scope for a contemporary micro-sociological understanding of the relationship between clinical work, science and technology, which discriminates between different sites and sources of technology and which more sharply focuses on the exercise of clinical perception and judgement as sources of genetic science. This is partly because the categorical work of sorting, identifying and naming patterns of physical features and other effects as having a genetic origin is still a relatively new specialty in medicine. However, it also reflects a much longer history of the interactions between clinical judgement and biological or biomedical science the pre-date the development of 'the new genetics' and its clinical applications. Foucault (1976) suggests that the clinic was constituted as the new location for the discovery of positive knowledge about the body and disease. He examines how medicine shifts from dyadic relations at the bedside, where the doctor observes the patient, and supports nature as illness runs its course, to the hospital, and the development of the clinical method, as a systematic method of observation and classification. For Foucault, the methods of the clinic constitute it as an important site of 'human science'.
It is not that the bedside was completely abandoned -to this day, dyadic relations between patient and doctor remain possible as an available source of information to contextualise medical understanding, but the clinic itself becomes the site of production.
What is produced is both medical scientific method and medical knowledge. Important aspects of the clinical method include categorical work based on observation. Here observation has to be 'pure' and 'uncluttered', free of the chimera of prior theories. What are being observed are bodies -the surface of the body for signs, and the depths of the body for the 'invisible' causes of these signs. The 'gaze' as modes of perception and annunciation makes the invisible visible (cf. Long 1992) . Critically, then, it is the clinic, not the laboratory, that is the locale for the discovery of modern medical knowledge.
The knowledge produced within the clinic was used to create anatomical maps of the body and classificatory systems of disease and its effects on/in the body. These methods are now recognizable as the traditions of clinical nosography and the classificatory mentality of medical thinking (King 1982) . Alongside the clinical work of observation and categorization, knowledge and method became increasingly standardised and codified. Thus the possibility arises for clinicians to be (re)presented not as natural scientists, 'listening, deciphering, interpreting', but as disciplined subjects 'looking according to a grid of perceptions, and noting according to a code' (Foucault, 1991:56) .
Thus, the gaze of the clinician, exercised and disciplined in ways of seeing/saying, itself 8 becomes a technology. Through a correct and systematic reading of the body the signs and symptoms can be identified (or read) which are then 'recognised' as those of a particular diagnostic category (Atkinson 1997) .
Thus, the methods of knowledge production developed in the clinic lie across two axes. The first axis allows the doctor-as-natural-scientist to move between methods of classification that read the surface of the body for signs, and technologies for making the inside of the body as the location of disease, visible. The second axis allows the doctor to move between the naturalist observation of the causes and effects of disease on/in the body, as modes of categorizing, and classificatory systems that fix medical science as 'grids and codes'. This duality in medical judgement is made more complex by the appearance of another site and source of science, the laboratory, and the development of new kinds of laboratory-based technologies, such as blood tests (cf. Atkinson 1995) .
Increasingly the rise of laboratory science appears to shift the locus of medical science from the clinic. Here the relationship between the clinic and science could be (re)presented in a similar way to the relation between the farm and the laboratory in Latour's study of the pasteurisation of France (1988) that is as 'remote control' (Cooper 1992) . Within this view, the clinic is remote and not involved in the production of medical knowledge. Rather, the pressure is for clinical staff to apply knowledge determined elsewhere, to efface complexity and heterogeneity, and to make decisions and 'dispose' (Berg 1992 , Latimer 1997 of patients, at an ever-increasing speed. Thus, the contemporary clinic could be reconstituted as a site of intervention in which science is merely consume and complete clinical episodes are produced. The point is not that grids and codes are abandoned within the clinic; instead, these are harnessed and sedimented 9 within classificatory systems determined elsewhere.
Representing the clinic as remote marginalises the importance of discretion and perception in clinical decision-making (Armstrong 2002) . While the contemporary object of the clinical gaze is, increasingly, the relation between the observed body and the dispersed images of pathology, establishing this relation relies upon processes of collective reasoning and adjudication rather than the simple application of prescriptive schemata (Atkinson 1995) . In addition, classificatory systems themselves can be understood to hide more than they reveal: they are reductions that efface the complexity and 'messiness' of medical categorising (Bowker and Star 2000) .
Our discussion of knowledge practices in the clinic, and the intersection of genetic science and clinical judgment, intersects with several key debates. On the one hand, there is the general debate concerning the interactions of 'the new genetics' and clinical medicine. On the other hand, there is the more specific issue of the 'geneticisation' of clinical medicine and clinical entities. The two are themselves interrelated in key ways; our own ethnographic evidence relates to both of these areas of contention, although our detailed case study of dysmorphology clinics departs from the general formulation of both.
The relationships between clinical medicine and biological science have a long history of contestation. Jamous and Peloille (1970) (Atkinson 1995) demonstrates the micro-politics of medical knowledge, whereby the personalised authority of the clinician intersects with -and may over-rule -knowledge invoked on the basis of research and 'journal science ' (cf. Fleck 1979) . The historical and philosophical contribution of Canguilhem (1989) to our understanding of medical knowledge has been especially influential in this general area.
Drawing on the history of physiology and pathology, especially in France, Canguilhem argues that the pathological is never reducible to the normal, and that the identification of clinical, pathological entities cannot be equated with the extension or extrapolation of the normal, either in terms of excess or in terms of deficiency. In general, he argues, one should not confuse the qualitative categories of the normal and the pathological with the quantitative expression of physiological values. From Canguilhem's perspective, therefore, the pathological occupies a distinct domain of knowledge deriving from the clinic, and relatively autonomous from that of the laboratory. Similarly, Sinding (1989 Sinding ( , 1990 Sinding ( , 1991 has explored the relationships between clinical medicine and biological science in her interpretation of the trajectory of rickets as a clinical entity.
In recent years, the relationships between the 'new genetics' in medicine and the laboratory have received particularly close attention from this perspective. For instance, Keating and Cambrosio (2001) have demonstrated that historical accounts of the 'new genetics' have been markedly, and inaccurately, skewed: significant advances are attributed to basic sciences and laboratory work, while major contributions arising from clinical research and practice are marginalized or ignored. They conclude that even sociologically sophisticated narratives, like Fujimura's genealogy of oncogene research (Fujimura 1996) , imply a linear model of development whereby basic research impacts upon clinical practice (cf. Gaudillière 1993 Canguilhem, they suggest that practice may be informed by an unproven belief that 'the monitoring of normal physiological variables will lead inevitably to the discovery of pathological signs' (p. 539). Keating and Cambrosio (2003) This model also stresses the intersection of the laboratory, the clinic, industry and mechanisms of regulation in networks of interdependence.
The recurrent motif in this expanding research literature is a scepticism concerning reductionist explanations of medical knowledge. There is a need to avoid the assumption that medical knowledge and practice can be accounted for in terms of increasing molecularization (e.g. de Chadarevian and Kamminger 1998) or the rise of technology (Wailoo 1997) . This is also a feature of the second key debate with which our work engages -concerning the so-called geneticization of contemporary medicine.
Kerr's exploration of cystic fibrosis is a key case in point (Kerr 2000) . She demonstrates the flexibility of genes and disease entities in the complex intersections between genetic and clinical research. While genetic reductionism is a feature of much of the scientific and medical texts she examines, she argues for social-science analyses that 'contextualise genetic reductionism' (p. 870), stressing the 'variability and contingency' that characterises the accomplishment of genetic categorizations. The consequent dialogue between Kerr and Hedgecoe (Hedgecoe 2003 (Hedgecoe , 2004 Kerr 2004) serves to underscore the fact that while social scientists may wish to treat 'geneticization' as a topic for inquiry (as reflected in the rhetoric and practices of scientists and clinicians), it should not be invoked as an unexamined explanation for current practice (see Hedgecoe 2002 , Hedgecoe and Tutton 2002 , Gibbon 2002 ). Cox and Starzomski (2004) , discussing the construction of autosomal dominant polycystic kidney disease, also argue that the complexities of everyday practice escape simple characterizations as 'geneticization'.
There are, of course, wider cultural analyses in which the notion of geneticization has been invoked to account for generic consequences of the new genetics (e.g. Lippman 1992, Finkler 2000) and to contest strong versions of a geneticised 'medicalisation' thesis (Cussins 1996 , Lock and Kaufert 1998 , Martin 1998 ).
There is, however, one major difference between the debates over geneticization and biomedical knowledge we have just referred to and our own empirical work reported here. Authors such as Keating and Cambrosio base their analyses on the close historical reading of published texts, and on interview materials gathered from protagonists.
Likewise, Kerr's analysis of cystic fibrosis is textual, based on a reading of published research and clinical work. Our own interest in the encounter between genetics and the clinic is grounded in a different research tradition. Our analysis is not based on the recent history of published science, but on the ethnographic exploration of mundane practices of genetic medicine. For us, the relationships between clinical and scientific knowledge are located in the interactions of specialists in the clinic. The respective contributions of laboratory science and clinical judgement are not, therefore, matters to be adjudicated or evaluated, but to be observed and interpreted within the ordinary, practical activities of diagnostic and related work. In that sense, therefore, the contribution of, say, Canguilhem (1989) is tangential to our own intentions. We are not concerned with questions of whether in principle the pathological can be derived from the normal or vice versa. Our sociological interests imply an indifference to Canguilhem's epistemological programme.
As we shall see, our ethnography implies a transformation of Canguilhem's problematic.
Rather than being a philosophical issue that requires a normative interpretation from observers, the relationship between laboratory science and clinical inference is a practical matter for the participants themselves. The evidential relationship between clinical observations, diagnostic inferences and laboratory investigations is a recurrent topic of everyday medical work itself. It is not susceptible to a general epistemological resolution.
To that extent, our interests also diverge from those of Keating and Cambrosio (2003) . 
Studying dysmorphology
In what follows, we analyse diagnostic processes in the clinic as mode (s) 
The organisation and division of genetic work
In the service under study, genetic work is distributed between consultants of clinical genetics, genetic specialist nurses (GSNs), other genetic associates, such as genetic counsellors, trainees in clinical genetics (specialist registrars or SpRs), other clinicians (GPs and other clinical specialists) and the family. In the current service, clinical genetic process is also distributed across different occasions: the home visit, the clinical consultation and the regular team meetings. These occasions are now described.
After referral, but prior to most clinic appointments, the genetic specialist nurse or counsellor makes contact with the individual referred (the proband) and their family.
Some families receive a home visit prior to their clinic appointment. The purpose of this visit is to take a history, create a family tree, and collect relevant materials (e.g. photographs). In addition, the nurse obtains permission to trace and acquire medical records for relevant family members, including test results and autopsy reports. At this stage there is no examination of the proband. A report of this visit, including the family tree, is placed in the medical records held by the clinical genetic service.
Usually, both the consultant and the GSN who has conducted the home visit are present at the initial clinical consultation. Here, the consultant discusses the route of referral and the family tree, and takes a history. At this stage a physical examination of the proband is carried out and the consultant may take photographs of those features that appear distinctive. Potential diagnoses, tests and other materials that may be required to aid a diagnosis are discussed, as are (if known) the causes of the condition, its progression and the risk of recurrence.
Team meetings usually consist of all members of the clinical team working under the direction of the genetic consultant. The relevant consultant geneticist together with the SpR and one or two GSNs were present at the team meetings observed in the study.
Within these meetings members review and prioritise new referrals, construct a diagnosis for both new and ongoing cases, gather materials to aid diagnosis and organise future clinics. These different materials are now discussed.
Genetic diagnostic practice and technology
As well as all the usual clinical technologies and processes, such as clinical history, biochemistry and CT scans, there are three distinctive materials used in dysmorphology diagnosis: photographs, family trees, and molecular and cytogentic tests. These are now described.
The clinical team uses two types of photograph: slides taken during the clinical consultation and family photographs collected by the GSN at the initial home visit.
Photographs taken in the clinic are used to make a record of specific and 'unusual' features, such as a unusual hands and feet or a 'distinctive' face. Family photographs are used to trace specific features, either in the proband themselves or across other family members. Some of these photographs are filed in the medical records and it is these rather than the patients themselves who are circulated at clinical meetings of experts at regional, national and international levels for teaching, research and diagnostic purposes Consultant 1: I remember his photos, leave it more than one, maybe two years. I wouldn't discharge him. He's got a lot of problems, it's worth keeping people on.
The key aspect that we want to emphasise here is the idea of 'keeping people on'. In the absence of a diagnosis, the clinicians are still working to categorize Simon; he is dysmorphic and has many associated problems. As a follow-up, he has been seen before, however, although the Consultant cannot categorize his problems within a specific syndrome, he still wants to keep him within the clinic and see him in a few years time.
Thus, the work of 'keeping people on' is as important as the work of making a diagnosis. This observation contrasts with other studies of medical processes that suggest that clinical work is usually aimed at achieving decisions that lead to the disposal of patients (Berg 1992 , Latimer 1997 ).
Our observations of the dysmorphology clinic suggest, therefore, that legitimating deferral is as important as making a diagnostic decision. Sometimes deferral is needed because the patient is a baby, and signs may emerge as the child gets older. However, Simon is eight years old, and although he does not fit any recognised syndrome, this may change.
Diagnostic decisions, or the decision to defer a judgment, have to be legitimated, and we will examine the significance of such acts in this context. We now discuss the different ways in which deferral and decision are accomplished.
Looking for dysmorphia
Making a diagnosis or keeping a patient within the clinic in the absence of a firm diagnosis can be achieved by establishing that they are dysmorphic. Thus, an important starting point for the clinical team prior to seeing a patients in the clinic is the examination of photographs during the team meeting. These are passed around and each look for distinctive physical signs and indicators on the body of the proband or their kin.
An individual has to look dysmorphic, and the clinical team has to be able to see this look. However, fitting someone's features into a classification of dysmorphia is not selfevident; it has to be established. For example, in the following extract the team discuss Louise, GSN1: Small jaw, cleft, heart defect.
[They discuss the referral letter and the term dysmorphia, the consultant turns to [They go on to speculate about other possible genetic origins to Charles'problems].
As the various members of the team scrutinise the photographs, they are considering whether Charles does or does not fit a diagnostic category, Soto's syndrome. Their gaze is contextualised by GSN1, who points out that Charles has learning difficulties. GSN2 sums up Charles' look, stating that his features are 'not striking', but maintains ambiguity over Charles' diagnosis by reminding the team that his learning difficulties were not caused by complications at birth (e.g. anoxia). Consultant 1 hesitates, suggesting that Charles' birth-weight was too low for him to have Soto's syndrome. As he puts the photographs away he seems to be about to dispose of Charles, relegating him, as it were, to the realm of normality; but in drawing the photographs back out of the envelope, he draws Charles back into the clinic.
The Consultant legitimates his action by stating that it is his inability to articulate what he sees, rather than the absence of something to see, that is the problem. Even though GSN2 suggests that Charles just 'doesn't look dysmorphic enough', Consultant 1 persists by stating that the forehead is 'quite striking'. GSN2 appears to reinforce GSN1's pressure to move Charles out of the clinic by saying his CT scan was normal.
However, the ambiguity and undecideability over whether Charles is dysmorphic enough, together with his learning difficulties, is enough to keep Charles on in the clinic and the team continues the search for other genetic possibilities for categorizing Charles.
Seeing a Syndrome
As we have begun to identify, dysmorphology relies upon the traditional clinical skill of reading the surface of the body for manifest and/or latent signs or features. For dysmorphic features to suggest an underlying syndrome, it is not necessarily because they are abnormal in themselves. Rather, for a feature to signify the possibility of a genetic syndrome it has to be aligned with other features across different anatomical systems.
Thus the origins of pathologies begin to be made visible through the application of a disciplined gaze (Foucault 1976) , even in the absence of definitive categories. This is made explicit in the consultant's comment about Charles: it is articulating what he sees and fitting these subtle signs within a particular syndrome that is difficult. The categories are still in the making.
In the extract above Louise's 'small jaw' becomes significant in the context of other observations, a cleft palate and a heart defect. Similarly, Charles' 'striking' forehead, when aligned with his learning difficulties, suggests a genetic origin, even though the nurses do not consider that he looks sufficiently dysmorphic. Thus, the molecular level can be 'seen' by being read into the various traces across different systems. The signs across different systems (long limbs, low brow, down-slanting eyes, pointy chin, hearing difficulties, etc) can be made visible as abnormalities because there are the beginnings of a map (however incomplete) with which to trace and link them. The genetic basis of features still has to be accomplished and be made visible.
Here it is important to differentiate between demonstrating that the patient's features are familial or indicative of a syndrome, that is, having a genetic base but non-familial, that is, not inherited. The first relies on the old clinical skill of seeing patterns of inheritance across generations, the second entails a stronger claim about aetiology that requires additional molecular, or other, proof.
Making it familial
Making it familial relies on the old clinical skill of seeing patterns of inheritance across generations. To do this, the clinical team draw together three strands of clinical (not laboratory-based) evidence, the family tree, the family history, and family photographs. [They all agree that they need to start by looking at Anna.] In discussing the case of Anna, the team traces features such as 'big heads' and learning difficulties across family members. They do this through aligning observations drawn from inspection of the photographs with specific details from the histories of family members.
Family photographs and family histories allow the team to look for features across family members. In the clinic, the search for familial resemblances is pursued explicitly in the construction of a family tree (cf Bouquet 1994 , Gibbon 2002 , Nukaga and Cambrosio 1997 The Consultant states he can see nothing very striking when looking at Lee's photographs, however, after examining the family tree, he aligns information from this source (that the mother's sister's son has learning difficulties) with the fact that Lee's face is 'a bit square-ish'. This alignment of evidence of a particular facial 'look' with a familial trace of a related problem is enough to strengthen the case for keeping Lee within the genetics clinic, even though his features do not look 'very striking'. The Consultant draws on the family tree to imply that he can see something in the family that might mean that Lee's problems are inherited and potentially genetic. Thus, the idea that features suggestive of a genetic syndrome may be expressed across family members is also incorporated into the family tree.
So far, we have seen how the team aligns evidence that a patient's features may have a genetic origin. They draw together details not just from looking at a patient, but also from a patient's history, by examining photographs of the patient and their family, considering the histories of the individuals within the family and the family tree, and offer observations of family members.
Making it genetic
We have noted how clinical process in dysmorphology is marked by deferral and undecideability. However, in assembling clinical data the team do sometimes stabilise a diagnosis.
The status of molecular tests is ambiguous. Definitive genetic tests are only available for a limited range of syndromes, and even when they are used, the clinical team may draw upon other evidence that can cast doubt on the reliability of a genetic test result. The clinical team move between their readings of the phenotype (physical features), and representations of the genotype (the molecular tests) in ways that privilege 'the clinical picture' rather than the laboratory based technology. The adequacy of the test may be regarded as insufficient to confirm a clinical diagnosis. However, rather than rejecting the diagnosis and disposing of the patient, the diagnosis may remain provisional. Casting doubt on the test occurs in a number of ways.
For example, a consultant and a GSN discuss the case of a family, the Smiths, who may have a genetic syndrome known as Fragile X. It emerged from their discussion that the results from the molecular test were unclear because they (the laboratory) 'couldn't do a Southern blot'. However, the distinguishing features of Fragile X could be traced in the family, the GSN states that the mother 'appears to have some learning difficulties' and that 'there are affected nieces and nephews'.
In this case, although the genetic test results were unclear, other materials were brought in to support a diagnosis of Fragile X; information in the family tree and observations from the home visit indicate that the family may have the genetic syndrome, reinforce the provisional diagnosis. In this way a negative test result does not rule out a provisional clinical diagnosis where other evidence can be brought into play, such as family history.
Thus the team assemble the evidence in ways that suggest that it is a genetic code that is being expressed, even if that code has not yet been mapped and cannot yet be 'seen' using molecular testing. Similarly, in the case of Alan, the blood test is negative but the clinical picture is strongly indicative:
Consultant 1: Myotonic dystrophy. Grip problems, cataracts, frontal balding.
GSN1: The full house almost but the bloods were negative.
Here the Consultant aligns the clinical evidence (grip problems, cataracts and frontal balding) to support the diagnosis of myotonic dystrophy, this man has the 'full house' even though the 'bloods were negative'. The implication is that DNA mutational analysis was unable to detect the molecular change associated with the syndrome, however, the team believe it is there, they can 'see' the evidence of the genetic condition in the patient.
A negative molecular test result can sometimes lead to discharge; however, it is not enough in itself, but only when it can be aligned with other evidence. This information is also interpreted in the context of the family; the nurse suggests that it may not be appropriate to pursue a diagnosis because the child's mother has 'enough on her plate'. Thus, the team moves away from a genetic diagnosis and Lindsay is discharged from the clinic.
It appears from the analysis so far that where a patient does not fit neatly into a clinical category this does not mean that they are discharged from the clinic. On the contrary, the clinical picture can be assembled in ways that legitimate deferral, so that a patient is 'kept on'. We have also seen that the molecular evidence itself is not necessarily relied upon. On the contrary, where there is negative molecular evidence but the team believes the clinical picture of a possible genetic disorder to be strong, a diagnosis is not excluded, but will remain provisional.
Stabilising dysmorphology diagnosis
As we have seen, where molecular tests are used, they are not privileged in any way as a form of evidence. Rather, we have seen how the clinical team move between different forms of evidence in their assessment of any particular case. Critically, the significance of any particular aspect of the evidence (e.g. looking dysmorphic) has to be established through aligning the evidence. It is the judgement and skill of the clinical team in making a case for the clinical picture that appears to be privileged over any single technology.
What has emerged, however, is how in the field of dysmorphology it is difficult to give a definitive genetic diagnosis. No diagnosis had been confirmed for Kyle, although Noonan's had been suspected. However, Costello's is 'similar' to Noonan's and the child may fit this classification.
Further, the discovery of 'major feeding problems' renews the team's interest and this may be the additional information the team need to firm up a diagnosis because major feeding problems can signify neuro-developmental behavioural problems. The Consultant decides to keep Kyle on and 'tout the photographs around again' at meetings with other experts.
The clinic, science and technology
The distinct nature of dysmorphology classification can be found in the way it explicitly uses clinical uncertainty as well as ambiguity and deferral. While it is increasingly possible to identify specific genetic tests for a number of dysmorphic syndromes that could previously be describable only in clinical terms, there is not a linear progression from clinical perception to laboratory testing.
Clinical perception and judgement, and the discretion of key experts that is differentiated as at the top of the hierarchy of knowledge practices in the work of categorising a patient and their troubles as possibly genetic or not.
What is being displayed is a degree of expertise: the 'gaze' has to be knowing and the clinician has to account for his/her perception or uncertainty. However, a definitive diagnosis for many patients cannot be accomplished at present. As one geneticist explained, even though the possibilities for delineating the precise molecular or chromosomal cause of a patient's problems by chromosomal analysis and differentiation are increasing, there is an ongoing process of clinical sub-and re-classification.
Specifically, for any one disorder, there is often a progression from clinical recognition as a distinct diagnostic entity, through the finding of the genetic basis of the disorder and the development of a diagnostic test, to a forced reclassification of the clinical entity to incorporate knowledge arising from the intersection of clinical and laboratory assessments. This is particularly true of anomalous categories of (1) clinical cases with no molecular changes found and (2) cases with the same molecular changes but a different set of clinical features, or none at all.
There are therefore several crucial features of the relationship between the laboratory science and clinical judgement in the context of dysmorphology. First, there is the progressive nature of the molecular laboratory based science, which is gradually introducing diagnostic certainty and an accurate understanding of disease mechanisms into this branch of medicine. The area of uncertainty is being steadily rolled back, but this process is only possible because of the prior clinical categorical work that allows laboratory science to tackle specific, soluble puzzles. Secondly, the advances of the laboratory science then permits a further refinement of the clinical classification of those cases and entities for which no precise understanding has yet been achieved -an iterative, reflexive and self-referential process. Finally, where a precise diagnosis is not achieved, clinical judgement is important in deciding whether a genetic basis is likely to be attainable in the medium future -whether future clinical genetic assessments are likely to be worthwhile. Thus in dysmorphology there is dependence on the clinic as well as the laboratory as a site of exploration and discovery in respect of the construction and refinement of genetic categorisation.
Conclusion
We have explored how clinical work in dysmorphology is involved in genetic categorizing, with a focus on the epistemological rather than the moral implications of genetic categorizing. Specifically, the paper has explored the interaction between molecular science, technology and clinical work within this speciality at the level of the clinic. The dysmorphology clinic is not simply a site in which some of the messy work of clinical classification is still observable, prior to its sedimentation in the 'pure space' of classificatory systems (Bowker and Star 2000) . There is a need to examine carefully what 'the mess' of classificatory work signifies. We suggest that we are witnessing the 'rebirth' of the clinic as a site of production of medical knowledge; or rather, the continuous 'renaissance' of the clinic, in the repeatedly renewed intersections of the clinical and the laboratory.
At the professional team meetings, deciding upon the appropriate description and classification of individual cases does not entail a straightforward application of a predefined set of clinical parameters. As we have seen, team members examine and debate the clinical details, including photographs of individuals and family trees, and they try to establish a diagnosis, or alternatively to come to a collective decision that there is currently no diagnosis to be made. In this clinical domain, however, members do not simply discharge the patient who fails to fit into a specific diagnostic category. On the contrary, clinicians go to great lengths to legitimate keeping patients on. They do this where they can construct a case for the genetic basis of a patient's features of problems, even if that basis cannot yet be 'proven', that is, seen at a molecular or cytogenic level. This relationship between the clinic and the laboratory constitutes a reversion, at one level, to an earlier relation between science, practice and technology, one that performs human perception and practical expertise as essential to the progress of knowledge about the human body and its troubles. But of course it is not ever that simple. For example, what is particularly interesting is how difficult it is to actually accomplish a definitive genetic diagnosis: genetic categorising is far from straightforward. Rather than contemporary forms of medical disposal and decisionmaking, in which the display of expertise entails speedy closure, what are found in the genetic clinic are explicit undecideability, uncertainty and instability over genetic diagnostic categories. We would like to (tentatively) suggest that undecideability, uncertainty and instability of genetic diagnoses as a prominent feature of dysmorphology clinical practice is highly significant and requires explanation when it runs alongside a firm commitment to a future of diagnostic certainty. Indeed it is the ambiguity and uncertainty which helps accomplish the need for that future, a future in which technology and classification will continue to press back the boundaries of the genomic unknown.
Here we need to elaborate.
In our analysis of the genetics clinic rather than simply applying predetermined 'grids and codes' to make the face or the family 'legible' (Atkinson 1995) , the lexicon of genetics is still very much performed as in the making. We want to suggest, therefore that undecideablity and instability in genetic diagnosis helps perform clinical perception and judgement as important in the generation of medical knowledge. This is not to assert for a moment that we are witnessing in the genetics clinic anything new: Clinicians, as we have seen, are engaged in making the genetic basis of someone's troubles explicit, or visible, in ways which involve familiar medical repertories. They make the invisible visible through looking and deciphering: they look at faces, and across families, and display and interpret representations of faces and families, such as photographs and family trees. In addition they are engaged in an old reduction: via the use of molecular technology the complexity of family and inheritance, and of all the traits and troubles that run across people's lives and bodies are reduced to a single (if sometimes complex) cause, the genotype. This methodology is nothing new in itself. Paradigmatically there is no gestalt switch (Kuhn 1970 ). But it is important for two reasons.
First, contemporary medical policy and practice performs the clinic as remote, as a space in which scientific work is no longer necessary. Rather science is increasingly configured as something that is merely being applied by clinical staff in the delivery of a service. In this representation of medicine, it is not the clinic but other centres of calculation that produce the science, fixed in the moment of a discovery, and diagnostic categories themselves are 'black-boxed' (Latour 1987) . Second, in keeping people on, and by making ambiguity and uncertainty explicit, the dysmorphology clinic paradoxically maintains a commitment to a future of diagnostic certainty. The future is where molecular science (mapping the genotype) having worked alongside the clinical categorising of the phenotype helps to fix diagnostic certainty. Indeed, the combination of deferral, ambiguity and uncertainty mean that the clinic is helping to legitimate the need for more molecular technology, more molecular science. This is because it is only the 'objective' evidence of a genotype at a molecular level that can be treated as finally fixing a diagnosis, until that moment diagnosis remains provisional, a matter of opinion.
Thus in our study the dysmorphology clinic emerges as a site in which some of the messy work of clinical classification is still observable, prior to its standardisation in classificatory systems, at the same time as it performs a commitment to a future of positive knowledge of genetic facts. It is this paradox which means that the genetics clinic is reborn as a site of discovery involved in the production of new knowledge, new 39 categories, but as those become fixed it may of course see its own demise.
